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Hume (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008)
Kant is quite explicit regarding the influence that David Hume exercised
on his thought, admitting that it was Hume who interrupted his ‘dog-
matic slumber’. Kant’s commentators have sometimes interpreted this
confession in a rather strong sense, as implying namely that Kant con-
ceived his own critical philosophy as a direct rebuttal of Hume’s various
sceptical challenges. So, Lewis White Beck and Henry Allison take Kant’s
Second Analogy to rebut Hume’s challenge to a general causal principle,
and Robert Paul Wolff and Patricia Kitcher spot a Humean target in
Kant’s account of mental activity and defence of the unity of the self.
This position is not universally held as some scholars, most notably Eric
Watkins, have argued that careful attention to the historical context in
which Kant’s first Critique is embedded exposes the belief that Hume
was Kant’s direct or primary target as itself a piece of philosophical
dogmatism. Paul Guyer’s latest collection, Knowledge, Reason, and Taste:
Kant’s Response to Hume, is an attempt to moderate this discussion.
Guyer’s suggestion is the modest, and indeed typically Kantian, one, that
Kant’s texts should only be read as if they were responses to Hume,
without making any historical claim of influence. While this thesis is
rather cautious, the payoff is that it permits Guyer to engage in a far
more ambitious analysis, leading him in the five essays contained in this
volume to consider not only Kant’s account of causality and general
theory of knowledge, but also his practical philosophy, aesthetics and
teleology in light of Hume.
This widening of scope is evident in the first chapter, where Guyer
outlines a general reading of Kant’s theoretical and practical philosophy
which places a philosophical premium on the refutation of scepticism.
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Guyer stresses, however, that scepticism as Kant understood it must be
distinguished from the current preoccupation with Cartesian external-
world and moral scepticism. The scepticism that would have been of
interest to Kant, according to Guyer, is commonsensical rather than
philosophically motivated. In particular, Guyer distinguishes Pyrrhonian
scepticism, associated with that doubt arising from the conflict of two
contradictory but equally well-supported claims, and Humean scepticism,
by which is understood a doubt regarding the first principles of theory
and practice. Kant’s first Critique on one hand, and his Groundwork
and second Critique on the other, are then considered with these distinct
challenges in mind. Since the former is also covered in the second chapter,
I will limit myself to a summary of Guyer’s reading of Kant’s response
to moral scepticism. In responding to the Humean sceptic about the
foundation of moral principles, Kant first shows that the principle of
morality (the categorical imperative) lies implicit in both common moral
understanding and philosophical treatments of morality. Second, Kant
demonstrates that this principle must ultimately have its source in reason
rather than experience inasmuch as our consciousness of the a priori
law of morality requires an efficacious faculty of reason. Regarding the
Pyrrhonian challenge, posed in the Third Antinomy as well as in the
Dialectic in the second Critique, Guyer argues that Kant’s transcenden-
tal idealism is intended as the solution: in the former case, the distinction
between things as they appear and as they are in themselves allows us
to admit without contradiction the respective claims of necessity and
freedom, and in the latter case it permits a resolution of the competing
unconditioned claims of virtue and happiness in the doctrine of the
highest good by warranting our belief in God and the immortality of
the soul.
In the second and third chapters, Guyer looks more closely at Kant’s
arguments in the first Critique (and the Introductions of the Critique of
Judgment) in a Humean context. He thus considers Kant’s responses to
Hume’s discussions of our idea of cause and beliefs regarding it (ch. 2)
and our ideas and beliefs regarding objects and the self (ch. 3). Guyer
admits that an initial survey of the texts produces a sense of a lack of fit
between Hume’s questions and Kant’s replies, but a more careful analysis
reveals that Kant does offer answers, albeit incomplete.1 Beginning with
chapter 2, Guyer boils Hume’s questions regarding causation down to
the following three: (1) What is the content of the idea of causation, or
necessary connection? (2) What is the basis for our belief in the general
causal principle that every event has some cause? And (3) what is the
basis for our particular causal beliefs or inferences? Hume offers his
own answers to these questions. In the Treatise of Human Nature and
the Enquiry concerning Human Understanding he claims that the basis
for particular causal beliefs is not a demonstrative inference, since that
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is undermined by his challenge to the rationality of induction; instead
they are the result of that customary disposition formed by repeated
observation of the appearance of one object following the other, the
impression of which (in accordance with the copy-principle) is the content
of the idea of causation. Neither of these two answers constitutes a
genuinely sceptical conclusion, but Hume’s conclusion regarding our
belief in the general causal principle (broached only in the Treatise) does,
since as wide as our past observation might be, it will never provide
experience of every kind of event and thus never supply sufficient warrant
for the principle. Guyer takes Kant to offer more or less convincing
alternatives to Hume on all three questions, but accuses him of avoiding
Hume’s fundamental challenge to the rationality of induction. In the
(Metaphysical and) Transcendental Deduction, and Schematism chapter,
Guyer takes Kant to show that the ‘content’ of the concept of causality
is the a priori logical function of hypothetical judgement (and that it
requires the pure forms of intuition in order to be applied). Kant’s
Second Analogy then rebuts Hume’s sceptical conclusion regarding the
general causal principle by proving that the cognition of an event is only
possible if the succession of (our perceptions of) states of an object can
be shown to follow in a determined order by being subsumed under
some causal law; thus, every event must have a cause. Both of these
answers, however, depend upon our knowledge of particular causal laws,
and thus an answer to Hume’s third question. According to Guyer this
is found only in the Introductions to the third Critique, in the idea of a
system of nature that regulates our investigation and makes possible the
discovery of empirical laws, though Guyer claims that this is not a
response to Hume so much as a concession of his essential point that,
ultimately, we can only assume that nature conforms to the laws we frame
for it. In any case, through all this, Kant leaves Hume’s fundamental
challenge to the rationality of induction untouched.
In chapter 3, Guyer turns to Kant’s claims to have ‘generalized’
(cf. AA 04.260) Hume’s problem regarding causation, which is taken to
mean the extension of the challenge to ideas of, and beliefs regarding,
external objects and the self. Guyer points out that Hume had already
presented his objections in an appropriately general form in the Treatise,
evidently unbeknown to Kant. Yet, even assuming that Kant intended
this by his claim to have generalized Hume’s problem (which is not
obvious), there is good reason to think that he had at least a second-
hand knowledge of the relevant sections through Hamann’s Sokratische
Denkwürdigkeiten of 1759.2 In any case, Guyer finds the same argu-
mentative structure in Kant’s response to Hume’s account of the content
of the idea of, and our beliefs regarding, persisting objects. For Kant,
the content is once again taken to be an a priori logical function of (cate-
gorical) judgement, and the justification for our beliefs in persisting
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objects found in the principle of the First Analogy (and ultimately the
Refutation of Idealism in B). Finally, Kant addresses Hume’s worries
that we cannot form a genuine idea of the self or have empirical cogni-
tion of its continued existence. Rather than being rooted in a particular
logical function, the idea of the self has as its content the I think, and
while Kant shares Hume’s doubts about the possibility of cognizing, for
instance, the simplicity of the self (as reflected in the Paralogisms), Kant
nonetheless allows for cognition of the successive states of the empirical
self (in the Refutation, and a series of later Reflexionen).
Chapters 4 and 5 turn to a consideration of Kant’s practical works
and the third Critique, though Guyer is now as interested in drawing
attention to the common premises as in pointing out the different conclu-
sions. In chapter 4, the familiar meta-ethical differences between Hume
and Kant are set aside and their respective accounts of moral determin-
ation compared. The result is an unexpected agreement on three points:
(1) the internalist claim that a moral principle must be capable of moti-
vating action, (2) the claim that change in moral behaviour is possible
through modification of passions and natural desires, and (3) that the
motivational force of morality is ultimately founded in a conception of
the good life in terms of self-mastery rather than slavery to passion and
inclination. That there is agreement on the first claim is perhaps least
surprising. Hume shows that he endorses it in his denial that reason,
whether operating in causal inference or in determining the agreement
of our ideas, is capable of influencing the will; Kant also adheres to it,
though he allows that practical reason can motivate by means of moral
feeling. Regarding the second claim, Hume contends that change in
unwelcome behaviour is possible, or at least more likely, through modi-
fication of our passions rather than through the appeal to reason. This
is initially less obvious in Kant’s case, but the importance Kant later
ascribes to the particular moral feelings of benevolence and self-esteem
(in the Metaphysics of Morals) suggests that he is interested in the modi-
fication, rather than the complete humbling, of self-conceit. This leads
to a more complex, and intriguing, analysis of moral determination: the
strength of the general moral feeling, caused by the moral law, leads us
to cultivate these particular moral feelings which are in fact the proxi-
mate causes of our actions. That Hume and Kant agree on the third
point of comparison, however, is much less obvious. Relying on sparse
evidence from minor sources, Guyer argues that Hume thought of the
good life in terms of the tranquillity that results from the mastery, rather
than extirpation, of our passions. To show that Kant endorses the ideal
of self-mastery as the ultimate source of the motivating force of the
moral law, and for which reason provides the means, Guyer draws a
parallel between Kant’s pre-critical and critical lectures on ethics and
anthropology. Kant had earlier proceeded on the basis of a fact of our
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psychology, namely, that we abhor servitude, to argue that freedom is
only possible when a rule of consistency among the principles of our,
and others’, actions is adopted. In the later works, Kant is thought to
replace the psychological premise with a normative one to the effect that
freedom is the sole condition of moral value, the means of realizing
which is provided by the law of reason, though Guyer (after rejecting
Christine Korsgaard’s apparently sympathetic account of the uncon-
ditional value of the freedom of choice) is hard-pressed to offer much
evidence for this.
Finally, Guyer turns to an analysis of the key themes of the third
Critique – the accounts of systematicity in the Introductions, judgements
of taste in the Analytic of the Beautiful, and teleological judgements –
in light of Hume’s various challenges. The first was already discussed in
chapter 2, so I will proceed directly to the latter two. In the single work
he devoted to aesthetic matters, the brief essay ‘Of the Standard of
Taste’, Hume claims that lacking firm precepts for judging beauty, the
consensus among critics, achieved over time and in ideal conditions,
constitutes a (suitably empirical) standard of taste. While Kant rejects
Hume’s conclusion, he nonetheless accepts his formulation of the funda-
mental problem, namely, accounting for the universality of judgements
of taste without relying on determinate concepts. This is reflected in
Kant’s strategy in the ‘Analytic of the Beautiful’, where Kant offers the
philosophical basis of our ordinary practices in making judgements of
taste. Kant thus identifies such judgements as both synthetic and a priori
and he attempts the deduction of their validity, first by, tracing our
pleasure in beautiful objects to the free play of our cognitive powers
and, second, by showing that these cognitive powers necessarily operate
in the same way in everyone. Guyer spots a weakness in Kant’s case for
the latter claim, however, since he seems to assume simply that indi-
viduals with the same powers cannot have divergent aesthetic responses;
still, Kant’s account is considered an improvement on Hume’s at least
insofar as it is flexible enough to distinguish various species of beauty
without losing sight of their common origin. Guyer then considers Kant’s
‘Critique of Teleological Power of Judgment’ as a reply to Hume’s criti-
cism of the argument from design in the Dialogues. Guyer stresses that
Hume only takes issue with the inference to a perfect creator without
contesting the naturalness and usefulness of teleological inferences
generally. Once this is conceded, we can see a familiar structure in Kant’s
response: he agrees with Hume that such judgements are important and
even irresistible, but disputes his empirical account of their origin. So,
based on the need for explanations of organisms as products of design
(rather than merely mechanically), Kant claims that we ought to employ
the idea of an intelligent design for the whole of nature, not in compe-
tition with, but parallel to, mechanical explanation by means of the
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distinction between appearances and things in themselves. Viewing nature
teleologically as well as mechanically will lead us to expand the scope
of mechanical explanation (as mechanical explanations are sought for
phenomena explained previously only teleologically) on the one hand,
and on the other it underwrites the investigation of the end of nature
itself, the only plausible candidate for which is the human qua moral
being.
As Guyer makes clear in the Introduction, the thread that connects
these five, otherwise self-standing essays is the contention that reading
Kant’s texts as if they were responses to Hume is ‘fruitful’ (7) or ‘illu-
minating’ (8), and that it even elucidates ‘Kant’s deepest philosophical
assumptions and ambitions’ (9). That Guyer achieves the former is, to
my mind, indisputable. He is certainly correct to warn as he does in the
introduction of the philosophical cost of removing Hume from Kant’s
cross-hairs altogether: ‘Hume raised more serious concerns about causal-
ity than had been raised by Leibniz’s fanciful monadology . . . [and]
Hume’s concerns required a far more powerful and general solution
than Sulzer or Tetens had offered’ (17). However, that Guyer succeeds
in showing that this reading elucidates Kant’s deepest philosophical
assumptions is less clear. For Guyer, the doctrine of transcendental
idealism, which Kant claims ‘runs through my entire work’ (AA 04.374),
evidently plays no part in his response to Hume, at least not in the
theoretical and practical contexts. Instead, Kant’s distinction between
appearances and things in themselves is thought to be urged against the
Pyrrhonian sceptic in the first Critique, and the similarities Guyer cata-
logues between Hume’s and Kant’s practical philosophies are limited to
‘the phenomenal level’, and thus are quite independent of the defence
of the freedom of the will that so underpins Kant’s moral thought. This
runs both ways, however, as Hume’s central challenge to the rationality
of induction, as Guyer stresses, goes completely unnoticed by Kant. This
is hardly news to Guyer – in fact he views the alleged separability of
transcendental idealism from the argument of the Analytic as a virtue –
but what it suggests is that Kant’s and Hume’s deepest philosophical
assumptions and ambitions were not necessarily those they happened to
share with one another.
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Note
1 It bears noting that Guyer does not consider the discussions of causation
in Hume’s Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, with which Kant was
familiar through the (selective) translation of J. G. Hamann finished in 1780.
Though not adding much in the way of detail, the Dialogues present these
results in a context Kant would certainly have found appealing: among the
passages Hamann supplies is Philo’s discussion of the misuse of the idea of
cause beyond experience (cf. Sämtliche Werke, vol. III, ed. Josef Nadler
[Vienna: Verlag Herder, 1951], pp. 255–6).
2 Strikingly, Hamann reports in a letter to Jacobi (27 April 1787) that ‘[i]ch
war von Hume voll wie ich die Sokr. Denkw. schrieb. . . . Unser eigen
Dasein und die Existenz aller Dinge ausser uns muss geglaubt und kann
auf keine andere Art bewiesen werden’ (quoted in J. O’Flaherty, Hamann’s
Socratic Memorabilia: A Translation and Commentary [Baltimore, MD:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967], p. 200; see also pp. 166–8 for
specific mention of Hume in this context).
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